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An evaluation of the 2014 fiscal reform: Insights 
from a survey of professional tax advisors
José Mª Durán-Cabré and Alejandro Esteller-Moré1
A review of tax advisers’ opinions over the recent tax reform indicates that 
changes are headed in the right direction in terms of eliminating distortions, 
mitigating tax planning, and reducing complexity. While the reform has not 
addressed all of the Spanish tax system´s shortcomings, the hope is that it will 
help sustain the Spanish economy’s recovery and greater stability in the fiscal 
system.
There have been recurrent demands for fiscal reform in Spain in recent years, strengthened 
by the economic crisis. A reform was passed in late 2014, which entered into force in 2015 
and 2016, and was concentrated on changes to the personal income tax and corporate tax 
regime. This article reviews the main features of this reform and attempts to identify the main 
shortcomings highlighted by tax advisors. In general, it is possible to conclude that the reform 
was a step in the right direction as regards addressing existing distortions/shortfalls, although 
there are areas that have not yet been addressed, such as the VAT and wealth tax.
1 University of Barcelona (UB) and Barcelona Institute of Economics (IEB).
Introduction
The Spanish fiscal system, like any other, is far 
from being perfectly fair, efficient and simple, 
with taxes that are exactly coordinated to finance 
public expenditure. Faced with this impossibility, 
economic analysis primarily focuses on applying 
taxes that can improve economic efficiency and, 
at the same time, foster a more just income 
distribution. This is because, although fiscal 
systems cannot be perfect, “the way in which they 
are designed is very important for economic well-
being” (Mirrlees et al., 2011, page 1).
Theoretical and empirical economic analysis offers 
an extremely useful toolkit with which to estimate 
the impact of taxes on the behaviour of economic 
agents. For example, public economy traditionally 
points to the importance of economic activities 
being taxed in the same way by the corporate 
tax and personal income tax (e.g., Crawford and 
Freedman, 2010). The same applies in the case 
of business financing decisions, as interest on 
debt is tax deductible, whereas the opportunity 
cost of equity is not. Indeed, this lack of neutrality 
may have worsened the recent financial crisis 
(e.g. Slemrod, 2009; and Keen et al., 2010). 
Consequently, academic literature shows there 
to be broad scope to achieve a fairer, more 
efficient and simpler fiscal system. However, if the 
aim is to achieve a better fiscal system, it would 
also seem worthwhile to consider the opinions 
of tax advisers. Drawing on their professional 
experience, how do they rate the possible sources 
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of inefficiency in major taxes, such as the income 
tax and corporate tax? From their knowledge of 
the fiscal system, would they conclude that it is 
simple? Is the tax burden distributed fairly? In 
short, do they believe the Spanish fiscal system 
needs reform?2
With the aim of capturing their views, we prepared 
a questionnaire, which was distributed among tax 
advisers in late 2012. The answers received gave 
us their perspective on fundamental aspects of 
taxes, such as efficiency, simplicity and equity 
of the fiscal system as a whole, and in particular 
the system’s two main taxes: the income tax and 
corporate tax. These are not regulatory opinions 
and may reflect certain biases, but they are of 
interest in studying taxation and can stimulate the 
debate on tax policies, with a view to improving 
them.3 The responses can also be used as a 
benchmark against which to judge the recent tax 
reform. 
Between 2015 and 2016 significant changes 
to the income tax and corporate taxes are due to 
come into force. These modifications affect the 
tax rates, and other relevant features with an 
impact on how tax bases and final tax liabilities 
are calculated. How should the changes brought 
by Laws 26/2014 and 27/2014 of November 27th, 
2014, be viewed? 
The rest of this article is organised as follows: The 
next section presents the findings of the survey 
of professional tax advisers. Subsequently, we 
discuss the main features of the tax reform passed 
in late 2014, and assess it in light of the survey 
findings. Finally, we offer some conclusions.
A survey of tax advisers on the 
Spanish fiscal system 
The Spanish fiscal system mainly operates 
through a self-assessment mechanism, that is to 
say, taxpayers themselves report the taxable event 
giving rise to the tax (e.g. earned income), analyse 
the regulations and calculate their tax liability 
(i.e. settle their tax). For this reason, tax advisers 
play a particularly important role in the Spanish 
fiscal system, as they often help taxpayers comply 
with tax legislation. Their first-hand knowledge 
of the system makes their opinion of how it 
operates very relevant. To this end, in late 2012, 
we surveyed tax professionals throughout Spain, 
asking them questions that had traditionally been 
reserved for academia.4 Our aim was not to 
ascertain tax advisers’ individual preferences, but 
to draw upon the knowledge they have obtained 
from their daily professional practice to infer the 
extent to which some of the issues identified by 
academia should or should not be considered 
deficiencies or shortcomings, and, therefore, merit 
reform. We describe the content of the survey and 
discuss its main findings below. 
The efficiency of the Spanish fiscal system
The questionnaire included a number of questions 
aimed at ascertaining Spanish tax advisers’ 
opinions about the efficiency of Spain´s fiscal 
2 The academic literature includes examples of surveys sent to professional tax advisers in order to gather their opinions on tax 
policy. For example, the American National Tax Association sent its members a survey in 1994 that included a subset of questions 
on the U.S. fiscal system that university professors specialising in public finances had been asked back in 1934. (Slemrod, 1994). 
More recently, the same association again sent its members a similar survey in 2013.
3 This same hope was expressed by Slemrod (1994) when analysing the results of the survey of U.S. tax professionals by the 
National Tax Association.
4 The survey was conducted in collaboration with the two main Spanish associations in the tax advisory field, the Asociación 
Española de Asesores Fiscales (AEDAF) and the Registro de Economistas Asesores Fiscal (REAF). Nevertheless, the survey stated 
that its aims were academic and that it was being run and analysed by the Instituto de Economía de Barcelona (IEB), a research 
institute. The questionnaires were distributed on-line (www.EncuestaFacil.com) and the replies were anonymous, although the IP 
address was used as a filter to avoid multiple replies being sent from the same computer. A total of 272 completed replies were 
obtained. To identify possible bias, questions were also asked about respondents’ personal characteristics and aspects of their 
work directly relating to the firm they work for. For more information about the survey, see Durán Cabré and Esteller Moré (2014).
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system. Unlike the case of fairness, where it is 
the set of taxes that should be progressive, from the 
point of view of efficiency, it is socially desirable 
that each tax be efficient individually.5 With this in 
mind, we asked about the possible distortions 
in the two main direct taxes, income tax and 
corporate taxes. 
 ■ Specifically, the questionnaire asked about 
the possible impact of the corporate tax on the 
following business decisions:
 ● Source of financing chosen (debt or equity). 
 ● Type of investment to be made (depending on 
tax-deductible depreciation).
 ● Country in which to invest (differences in tax 
rates).
 ● Company legal structure (manner in which 
business is legally organised).
 ● Tax planning to pay less (tax avoidance 
practices).
 ■ In the case of income tax, the questionnaire 
includes the following topics relating to 
taxpayers’ decisions: 
 ● Legal structure of the activity (creation of 
companies).
 ● Autonomous region of residence (mobility).
 ● Home purchasing rather than lease (to obtain 
the tax deductions on purchase of principal 
residence).
 ● Types of assets used for savings.
 ■ In the case of income tax, various questions 
were also included on the objective estimate 
or flat-rate scheme envisaged by legislation for 
small-scale economic activities, which also has 
an impact on the efficiency of the fiscal system:
 ● Module-based objective estimation facilitates 
tax fraud (in income tax and other taxes).
 ● Business owners who pay tax under this 
system benefit (as they pay less tax than they 
should according to their actual income).
 ● Objective estimation is simpler than direct 
assessment. 
 ● Elimination of objective estimation and 
application of direct assessment as the sole 
assessment criterion would increase tax 
evasion.
There were four possible replies to each question, 
assigning each one a value: totally disagree, with 
a value of 1; agree somewhat, value 2; generally 
agree, value 3; and strongly agree, value 4. 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the 
responses given on efficiency, with items ordered 
from greater to lesser degree of agreement with 
the statement. 
The average score for five of the questions was 
over 3, indicating a high degree of agreement with 
the issue raised. In these five cases, it is the fiscal 
system itself that is the source of the distortion, 
either because it facilitates tax evasion or 
because it allows taxpayers to pay less than they 
should based on their real income (modules), or 
because it gives rise to tax planning (organisation 
and planning of economic activities in income 
tax and corporate tax), or because it encourages 
people to buy their home (rather than rent). As a 
consequence, in relation to these five aspects, tax 
advisers’ professional experience leads them to 
suggest that these two taxes represent a source 
of distortions, due to the features of the legislation 
governing these two taxes. 
5 A tax may sometimes be intended to correct negative externalities, in which case what is sought is an improvement in efficiency 
by correcting a socially harmful behaviour.
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The level of agreement on the other eight 
issues varies widely. In particular, there is a 
reasonable level of agreement that the corporate 
tax encourages the adoption of business legal 
structures, such that the legislation would again 
be a source of inefficiency. There is fairly strong 
agreement that the corporate tax determines 
what country to invest in, and Spanish income 
tax influences what autonomous region 
taxpayers choose to live in. These distortions 
are caused by the mobility factors, together with 
the decentralisation of income tax in the case of 
the latter. The degree of conformity is similar, i.e. 
more or less in agreement, when considering that 
the application of modules is simpler than direct 
assessment.
There is less agreement, with a tendency 
towards neutrality, that the corporate tax shapes 
the degree of financing from debt or equity and the 
types of investments made, or that the income 
tax determines the form of savings. These three 
issues are relevant precisely because they have 
been analysed in considerable detail by academic 
literature as sources of distortion. Finally, there 
was little agreement that eliminating the objective 
estimation system and applying direct assessment 
universally would result in an increase in tax 
evasion.
As a result, it is difficult to conclude how efficient 
the Spanish fiscal system is, but tax advisers’ 
replies suggest that changes in the legislation 
– by eliminating distortions– may increase its 
efficiency, either by eliminating tax planning 
practices or discouraging changes in behaviour.
The complexity of the Spanish fiscal 
system (as a potential source of 
inefficiencies) 
The very complexity of the fiscal system may 
indirectly constitute another source of inefficiency, 
insofar as it facilitates tax planning, for example, 
to exploit loopholes or inconsistencies in 


Variable Observ. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Opinion
Income tax: Fraud using modules 272 3.500 0.778 1 4
AGREE STRONGLY
Income tax: Legal structure 272 3.379 0.778 1 4
Corporate tax: Planning 272 3.316 0.756 1 4
Income tax: Benefit from modules 272 3.140 0.894 1 4
Income tax: Housing 272 3.051 1.000 1 4
Corporate tax: Legal structure 272 2.923 0.928 1 4 QUITE AGREE 
Corporate tax: Country 272 2.710 0.976 1 4
Income tax: Simplicity of modules 272 2.651 1.136 1 4
Income tax: Residence 272 2.632 0.963 1 4
Corporate tax: Financing 272 2.426 0.934 1 4
Corporate tax: Investment 272 2.404 0.858 1 4
Income tax: Assets 272 2.312 0.856 1 4
Income tax: ∆ Fraud if modules 
eliminated 272 1.901 0.984 1 4 DO NOT AGREE
Table 1
Significance of distortions in the Spanish fiscal system  
Source: Own elaboration.
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the fiscal system, of which there tend to be more the 
more complex the rules. However, complexity can 
cause efficiency losses directly, to the extent that 
it generates uncertainty (Giertz, 2012), or rather, 
adds greater certainty to that already existing in a 
market economy. For this reason, the survey also 
addressed the issue of the complexity of the fiscal 
system. 
Specifically, tax advisors were asked: Do you 
consider the Spanish fiscal system to be more 
complex than it was 5, 10, 15 or 20 years ago? 
The answers in each case could be only Yes (=1) 
or No (=0). In this respect, whatever the time frame 
(5, 10, 15 or 20), the answers overwhelmingly 
reported greater complexity (the range was from 
0.87 (taking the last five years) to 0.91 (when the 
range was the last 15 years)). Consequently, tax 
advisers are almost unanimously agreed that the 
fiscal system has become more complex in recent 
years. 
What kind of factors are driving this greater 
complexity? It is particularly interesting to 
analyse whether the factors are exogenous to the 
legislation, such that complexity is an intrinsic 
feature of today’s fiscal systems that has to be 
borne. Or alternatively, that the factors behind it 
are endogenous and, therefore, it is legislation that 
is causing increased complexity. The response to 
each of these factors is again a dichotomy: Yes 
(=1) or No (=0). The factors are not mutually 
exclusive, as increased complexity may come 
from a combination of the two. The results are 
shown in Table 2. 
By a wide margin, tax advisers consider the 
origin of the complexity to be endogenous, 
and almost 100% of respondents consider the 
main factor to be to continual amendment of 
the legislation, which, moreover, leads to legal 
uncertainty. The interpretation of the legislation 
and the terms in which it is drafted are the two 
other endogenous factors that over 60% of
Tax advisers almost unanimously agree that 
the Spanish fiscal system is highly complex, 
mainly as a result of the continuous changes 
made to the legislation, which also lead to legal 
uncertainty. The way in which the legislation 
is drafted and interpreted are two more factors 
adding to its complexity.
advisers felt cause greatest complexity, while 
decentralisation of legislative authority to the 
autonomous regions was only considered a 
cause of complexity by 40% of respondents. 
Moreover, the results clearly indicate that 
Variable Observ. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Endogenous Factors
Continual changes to the regulations 272 0.982 0.135 0 1
Interpretation of laws by the administration 272 0.684 0.466 0 1
Deficient legislative drafting 272 0.614 0.488 0 1
Attribution of legislative power to the regions 272 0.408 0.492 0 1
Exogenous Factors
Internationalisation of the economy  
and mobility of tax bases 272 0.191 0.394 0 1
Growing market complexity 272 0.191 0.394 0 1
Table 2
Source of greater complexity: Endogenous factors/exogenous factors 
Source: Own elaboration.
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only a minority of tax advisers (19%) consider 
complexity to be caused by exogenous 
factors,such as internationalisation and mobility 
of tax bases and growing market complexity. 
The equity of the Spanish fiscal system 
Having ascertained the tax advisers’ views on 
issues related to the efficiency and complexity 
of the fiscal system, they were also asked how 
they rated the system from the equity point of 
view, based on their professional experience. 
Specifically, the question asked was: Do you 
think that those who contribute most are the 
wealthiest, or the middle and working classes? 
Here the question was strictly positive, leaving 
normative issues to one side –as suggested at 
the start of this section. The result of the answers 
was overwhelming: 93.4% considered that the 
middle and working classes made the biggest 
contribution, and only 4.4% that the richest did, 
while 2.2% did not know the answer. As a result, 
based on this finding, it may be concluded that tax 
advisers’ professional experience teaches them 
that the fiscal system as a whole is regressive. 
To conclude, do they believe the Spanish 
fiscal system needs reform? 
The survey’s findings show the Spanish fiscal 
system to suffer from significant inefficiencies and 
that it is considered overly complex and unfair. 
But, looking back to late 2012, did they think the 
Spanish fiscal system needed reform? Almost 
90% of the tax advisers surveyed considered that 
the Spanish fiscal system did indeed require an 
overall reform. The estimate by ordinary least 
squares (see Table 3) does not suggest significant 
bias resulting from characteristics of respondents 
or the firms in which they work, although it should 
be noted that there was a big difference between 
advisers based in the “foral” communities of 
Navarre and the Basque Country and those 
elsewhere in Spain. 
The 2014 fiscal reform: An assessment 
based on tax advisers’ opinions 
The 2014 fiscal reform focused particularly on 
the personal income tax and the corporate tax, 
and was enacted through Laws 26/2014 and 
Variables Need for reform
Years of experience 0.0066
(0.041)
Age 0.0011
(0.003)
Sex -0.0020
(0.061)
Educational attainment -0.0283
(0.036)
Professional grade -0.0049
(0.031)
Size of firm 0.0081
(0.034)
Average income in region -0.0411
(0.056)
Wealthy region -0.0387
(0.045)
Foral region -0.4329***
(0.094)
Constant 0.9260***
(0.201)
Observations 272
R2 0.091
Standard errors in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3
Analysis of biases in responses on the need 
for an overall reform of the fiscal system 
Source: Own elaboration.
6 While it is true that Law 28/2014 was also passed, making changes to the VAT and other indirect taxes, the scope and interest of 
the reform is much smaller for the purposes of our objective, so the changes introduced will not be discussed here.
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27/2014, respectively, on November 27th, 2014.6 
Both legislative instruments have introduced tax 
cuts, and have modified a number of aspects of 
both how the tax base and liability are calculated, 
so may therefore have an impact on how the tax 
burden is distributed and the efficiency of the 
system. In this section, we will discuss and analyse 
those changes we consider most significant for 
these purposes and which relate to the issues 
raised in the survey of professional tax advisers. 
Objective estimation by modules  
in income tax 
Small and medium-sized enterprises can opt to 
apply the objective estimate arrangements for 
their personal income tax, based on certain signs, 
indices and modules, under which they pay a flat 
rate. Law 26/2014 retains this system, although 
it significantly reduces its scope of application by 
making the limits that have been set over time 
more restrictive. Moreover, the new legislation 
expressly excludes certain activities that could 
previously opt for objective estimation. 
Specifically, one of the limits derives from the net 
earnings obtained the previous year. The threshold 
has been reduced from 450,000 euros to 150,000 
euros for the taxpayer’s economic activities as 
a whole.7 Additionally, contrary to the previous 
situation, when calculating this amount, all the 
transactions carried out need to be taken into 
account, regardless of whether there is the 
obligation to issue an invoice or not. In any event, 
a specific lower limit of 75,000 euros is set in the 
case of transactions for which an invoice is to be 
given. Another limit envisaged takes into account 
the volume of purchases of goods and services, 
excluding fixed assets, in the previous year. In this 
case, the amount has been reduced significantly, 
from 300,000 euros to 150,000 euros. 
The reform also eliminates the cause of extinction 
established for other activities.8 The elimination 
is justified by the fact that the Thirty-sixth additional 
provision of Law 26/2014 establishes the exclusion 
of a large share of these activities from objective 
estimate arrangements. Specifically, this 
affects activities related to the rates of the 
municipal business tax, mainly corresponding to 
the manufacturing and construction industries. 
It is also envisaged that the specific amount for 
other activities not directly excluded be reduced in 
order to further curtail the application of objective 
estimation. 
Consequently, the new more restrictive limits 
and the exclusion of certain activities aim to 
significantly reduce the activities that can use this 
approach, limiting them mainly, as the preamble 
to Law 26/2014 states, to activities that entail 
dealing directly with end consumers. 
How can this legislative change be judged based 
on the survey’s findings? As Table 1 shows, a 
large portion of tax advisers have concluded that
The new legislation reducing the scope 
of application of the objective estimate 
arrangements should lead to a fairer and more 
efficient distribution of the tax burden, and a 
reduction in tax evasion.
objective estimation by modules facilitates tax 
evasion in the case of income tax and other 
taxes. They also strongly agree that the amount 
estimated on the objective estimate approach is 
less than would be the case if actual earnings 
were assessed, which obviously benefits this 
group of business owners. Finally, professional tax 
7 In the case of agricultural and forestry activities, the earnings-based exclusion limit has been cut from 300,000 euros to 250,000 euros.
8 Specifically point (e) of Article 31.1.3 of the tax law for certain activities when the net earnings from them in the immediately preced-
ing year collected from parties obliged to make withholdings or advance payments exceeds a certain threshold.  This scenario was 
introduced by Law 7/2012, October 29th, 2012, on the prevention of and the fight against fraud.
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advisers do not believe that eliminating objective 
estimation would increase fraud. Consequently, 
based on tax advisers’ judgement, the new 
legislation’s restricting the scope of application 
of objective estimate arrangements may be 
viewed favourably. It may also be considered 
that the reduced scope of application of objective 
estimation will enable a fairer and more efficient 
distribution of the tax burden, and a reduction 
in tax evasion. On the other hand, does it imply 
greater complexity in the application of the tax? 
Again, based on their professional experience, 
tax advisers generally agree that objective 
estimate arrangements are simpler to apply, 
although the view is not overwhelming.
In short, this measure is in line with that advocated 
by academia (e.g. see the Decalogue for a reform 
of the fiscal system in Esteller and Durán, 2013, 
signed by 50 Spanish university lecturers; or 
Paredes, 2010), although we should still consider 
whether it would not be more advisable to 
eliminate objective estimation entirely and replace 
it by a simplified method that would ensure small 
business owners paid tax more in line with their 
real economic capacity. Indeed, the Lagares 
Report (Comisión de Expertos para la Reforma 
del Sistema Fiscal Español, 2014) proposes the 
total elimination of objective estimation. Moreover, 
it is surprising that the changes to objective 
estimation described above do not come into 
force until 2016, except that the intention is to give 
more time to business owners affected to adapt to 
the extra formal obligations arising out of taxation 
by direct assessment. 
Tax rates, estimating the tax base and 
deductions for economic activities in 
income tax and corporate tax
When analysing the income tax and corporate tax, 
it is important to look at them both together, as 
they both affect income and there may, therefore, 
be a certain transfer of income from one tax to 
the other. 
The tax scale of each tax is the first element to 
consider, and tends to be the element on which 
public opinion focuses. In this regard, the reform 
introduces a cut in the tax rates applied in the 
case of both taxes. In the case of the income 
tax, as of 2015, the complementary scale applied 
since 2012 has lapsed, which entails a reduction 
in total marginal rates of between 0.75 and 7 
percentage points. Additionally, the tax rates on 
the general state scale will drop by between 1 and 
2.5 percentage points in 2016 (0.5 points in 2015), 
although with the change in the number and width 
of the brackets (reduced to five), marginal rates 
may go up for some taxpayers.9 
In the case of the corporate tax, the general rate 
has been reduced to 28% in 2015 and 25% from 
2016 onwards.10 This reduction means that as of 
2016, the lower rate for small businesses will be 
eliminated. The preamble to Law 27/2014 justifies 
this on the grounds that the difference in rate is 
a “disincentive or obstacle to business growth.” 
The rate of tax that has been in effect for “micro-
enterprises” to maintain or create employment will 
also be eliminated as of 2016. Lastly, reform to 
corporate tax maintains and expands the reduced 
rate envisaged for newly created firms established 
since 2013, such that firms established as of 2015 
pay tax at a rate of 15% of total profits in the first 
two years in which they obtain positive earnings. 
Consequently, in terms of nominal tax rates, the 
difference between the maximum marginal rates 
of the personal income tax and the general rate 
of corporate tax has narrowed with the reform. 
Whereas in 2014, the maximum marginal rate 
of personal income tax was between 46.9% and 
56%, depending on the autonomous region in 
which the taxpayer lives, in 2015, it is between 
44.5% and 49%. By cutting the general corporate 
9 On top of this reduction, changes in the regional brackets need to be added, depending on the rate each autonomous region sets.
10 However, the tax rate has been kept at 30% for credit institutions.
11 The lowest marginal rate is in Madrid and the highest in Catalonia. The comparison for 2016 has been made assuming that the 
regional rates do not change with respect to 2015.
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tax rate to 28% in 2015, the difference between the 
two taxes has dropped from 26 percentage points 
to 21 points in 2015 and 23 points in 2016.11 With 
the fiscal reform, therefore, it seems that the gap 
between the maximum rate of personal income 
tax and corporate tax has narrowed somewhat, 
although a considerable difference remains. 
However, the reduced rate of 15% envisaged for 
newly created firms means that when starting 
a new business or professional activity, the 
difference in income tax and corporate tax rates is 
very large, reaching up to 33 percentage points, 
although this difference will only persist for the 
first two years of profits. 
If we take into account the additional tax burden 
a shareholder in a company faces in the form of 
the tax on the dividends received, the result 
of comparing the nominal tax rates certainly 
changes. Indeed, elimination of the exemption on 
the first 1,500 euros of dividend payments in force
Income tax has led to company structures 
being set up to reduce tax charges. Some 
of the changes introduced by the reform of 
corporate tax may help avoid this, although 
the impact of other changes may act in the 
opposite direction.
until 2014 implies the full adoption of the classic 
approach to taxing dividends. This means that the 
total taxation as of 2016 will be 42.25%, if we add 
the upper marginal tax rate of the savings scale 
of 23% to the corporate tax rate. Consequently, 
the total value is much closer to the higher 
marginal income tax rates an individual business 
owner may have to pay. However, if the company 
refrains from distributing dividends, the level 
of taxation will be only that of the corporate tax. 
The taxpayer can therefore decide when and at 
what rate he pays income tax on this income.12 
Is the difference between the income tax and 
corporate tax rates significant for tax advisers? As 
Table 1 shows, the second question that generates 
the highest degree of agreement among tax 
advisers (an average value of 3.379) is precisely 
that personal income tax leads to the creation 
of company structures in order to reduce tax 
charges.13 In any event, when comparing income 
tax and corporate tax, it is not just nominal tax 
rates that are relevant, as we also need to take 
into account differences in the calculation of the 
respective tax bases and deductions. 
In this regard, in the direct assessment of the 
earnings from economic activities, the personal 
income tax legislation refers mainly to corporate 
tax legislation, thus guaranteeing a degree of 
neutrality.14 However, certain specific features 
of simplified assessment should be noted. 
In particular, tax-deductible depreciation is 
calculated on a straight-line basis from a simplified 
depreciation table and there is a reduction of 5% 
of net earnings for expenses that are difficult to 
substantiate. With the reform under Law 26/2014, 
a ceiling of 2,000 euros is imposed on expenses 
that are difficult to substantiate.15 The limit will 
12 From the academic point of view, it would be more appropriate to talk of marginal rates or effective average rates. Nevertheless, 
nominal rates are also relevant, indeed they are the focus of public debate, so are therefore likely to be those professionals take 
into account when they are asked if income tax leads to company structures being created.
13 The academic literature highlights that it is important to avoid the legal form an economic activity takes affecting how it is taxed. 
For example, De Mooij and Nicodème (2008) observe that between 1997 and 2003 in 17 EU countries there was a transfer of 
income from personal income tax to corporate tax. Specifically, they estimate that the differences in the rules on the two taxes 
lead to a transfer to corporate tax accounting for between 10% and 17% of this tax’s total tax collection. In the case of Spain, 
Domínguez et al. (2005) find, on the other hand, fiscal factors not to be significant in Spanish firms’ organisational decisions, al-
though the authors are cautious about the results in view of the short time period available in their study.
14 Objective estimation was analysed in the previous section, so will not be discussed again here.
15 This figure coincides with the fact that the new deduction for other expenditure was introduced with the reform in the calculation 
of employment income.
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therefore affect taxpayers declaring net earnings 
of more than 40,000 euros. 
In the case of corporate tax, the special 
arrangements for small businesses have been 
retained, although some important changes have 
been made. As of 2016, they will no longer benefit 
from a lower tax rate, as the general rate is set at 
25%. The flexible depreciation provided for small 
value investments has also been eliminated, as 
it has been made available to all businesses, 
as we shall see. Accelerated depreciation for 
reinvestment of extraordinary income has also 
been eliminated, in line with the elimination of 
the similar deduction that until 2014 had been 
applied to the tax due. And finally, the deduction 
for investment of profits that small entities have 
been able to apply for their earnings obtained in 
the financial years beginning in 2013 and 2014 
has also been eliminated. 
Therefore, from now on, the special arrangements 
for small businesses will be limited to flexible 
depreciation for investments creating jobs, 
accelerated depreciation of new fixed asset items 
and impairment of credit for possible insolvencies. 
As an important new feature, the reform introduces 
a tax concession that, indirectly, allows tax losses 
to be offset with profits from past years, similar to 
the retroactive offsetting of losses in past years, 
known as loss carryback. 
Specifically, the so-called levelling reserve allows 
a small entity to reduce its positive tax base in a 
given year by up to 10%, up to a maximum of 
a million euros. This negative adjustment must be 
reversed in the following five years provided the 
company has a negative tax base. In other words, 
it is possible to offset losses incurred in the five 
following years. If insufficient losses have been 
incurred in this period, the remaining amount 
must be added to the tax base in the last year of 
the period. The company is required to constitute 
a non-available reserve for the amount of the 
reduction to the tax base. This non-availability 
ceases when the adjustment is backed out, i.e. 
within five years.
Consequently the new reserve allows the taxation 
in a tax period to be reduced against the losses 
incurred in the subsequent five years, thus 
bringing forward the application of future negative 
tax bases. If these losses are not incurred during 
the five year period, the adjustment is reversed 
in the fifth year, such that finally a deferral of 
taxation on the reserve has been obtained. 
As a result, the new corporate tax retains the 
special arrangements for small entities, which in 
practice means they can defer a portion of the 
tax. These arrangements are also applicable 
to business owners who are subject to direct 
assessment for personal income tax, with the 
exception of the levelling reserve, which of 
its nature, does not apply to natural persons 
conducting a business activity. 
In short, corporate tax includes special treatments 
that may influence the choice of company legal 
structure. On this point, when tax advisers were 
asked if the tax influences decisions on the legal 
structure of companies, we obtained a relatively 
high degree of agreement, with 2.923. Eliminating 
the reduced rate and reinvestment deductions 
for small businesses could help make the tax 
more efficient, but in turn, the general application 
of a reduced rate for new entities, together with 
the maintenance and creation, in the case of the 
levelling reserve, of certain tax benefits seems to 
go in the opposite direction. 
The treatment of debt and equity in the 
corporate tax
In most countries, the corporate tax allows interest 
on debt to be deducted, whereas the opportunity 
cost of equity is not deductible. This bias in favour 
of debt has been given more attention in the 
wake of the recent crisis. Thus, empirical studies 
(e.g. Slemrod, 2009; Keen et al., 2010) show that 
this distortion, while not being the main cause of 
the financial crisis, has nevertheless contributed 
to its spread. 
An evaluation of the 2014 fiscal reform:  Insights from a survey of professional tax advisors
63
SE
FO
 - 
Sp
an
ish
 E
co
no
m
ic
 a
nd
 F
in
an
ci
al
 O
ut
lo
ok
Vo
l. 
4,
 N
.º
 2
 (M
ar
ch
 2
01
5)
 
In response, countries such as Germany, France, 
the United Kingdom, and Spain since 2012, have 
introduced limits on the deductibility of debt. 
Specifically, in the Spanish case, net financial 
expenses are fully deductible up to a million 
euros, with a limit of 30% of operating profit 
over this threshold. Financial expenses arising 
on transactions within a business group have 
also been made non-deductible, unless these 
transactions are reasonable from an economic 
viewpoint. However, the intended purpose of 
these limitations has not been to ensure neutrality 
between debt and equity financing, but to combat 
international tax planning by multinationals. 
A significant new feature introduced by Law 
27/2014 was a capitalisation reserve with the 
aim, as expressed in the preamble, of “having an 
impact on the neutrality of how business finance 
is raised, stabilising a balance that has for a long 
time been inclined in favour of debt.” Specifically, 
companies can apply a reduction in their tax 
base of 10% of the increase in equity during the 
financial year, up to a limit of 10% of the tax base. 
If this limit is exceeded, the pending reduction 
can be used in the tax periods ending in the two 
following years. In order to apply this reduction, 
the increase in equity must be maintained over five 
years and a reserve, which is to be unavailable for 
the period, set aside for the value of the reduction. 
Consequently, as of 2015 entities that increase 
their equity benefit from a tax incentive equal to 
10% of the increase, which will certainly improve 
the neutrality of the tax for companies’ financial 
decisions. This incentive, combined with the 
retention of the limits on the deduction of financial 
expenses, reduces the traditional asymmetry 
between debt and equity financing.
Do tax advisers believe that corporate tax’s 
asymmetry influences the way in which companies 
are financed? The survey suggests that they 
take a somewhat sceptical view, with an average 
value of 2.426. Therefore, they do not consider 
corporate tax to be the most important factor 
when deciding how to raise finance, or at least 
not universally. To conclude, although the change 
introduced in 2015 should be viewed favourably 
insofar as it reduces the bias in favour of debt, 
tax advisers’ view is that financing decisions 
depend at the margin on factors unrelated to tax
For tax advisers, corporate taxation has not 
been the most important factor in choosing 
between debt and equity finance, which is 
more dependent on other factors. However, 
the changes introduced in 2015 should be 
viewed positively as they reduce the fiscal bias 
towards debt.
treatment, such as access to credit, investment 
opportunities or expected returns.
Neutrality in investment decisions 
Depreciation reflects the deterioration suffered by 
capital goods over time as a result of their operation, 
use and obsolescence. From the theoretical point 
of view, when calculating economic profit, the real 
deterioration of capital goods should be deductible. 
Nevertheless, in practice, when calculating the 
tax base, effective depreciation is calculated 
using officially approved depreciation tables, in 
order to simplify tax compliance. Specifically, the 
implementing regulations for corporate tax, Royal 
Decree 1777/2004, of July 30th, 2004, set out the 
official depreciation tables in an annex following 
the National Classification of Economic Activities´ 
(CNAE) structure. That means setting the 
maximum coefficient and maximum depreciation 
period for more than 650 depreciable items. 
The tax reform introduced a significant new 
feature, as the coefficients and maximum 
depreciation period are now regulated by Law 
27/2014, Article 12, and the number of items 
has been considerably reduced, with just 33 
now regulated. This is a clear example of a 
trade-off between efficiency and simplicity. As 
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they regulated so many depreciable items, the 
tables applied previously took sector specificities 
into account better, such that depreciation could 
be kept closer to its effective rate. However, as 
explained in the preamble to the law, the legislator 
considers it important to “simplify the depreciation 
tables, reduce their complexity, and provide more 
up-to-date tables that can be better applied in 
practice.” 
As regards depreciation, the new legislation also 
introduces the new feature of flexible depreciation 
of low value goods, the precedent for this being 
the arrangements that existed for small entities, 
which, as mentioned above, have now been 
eliminated. Specifically, there is freedom over 
the depreciation of new fixed assets worth under 
300 euros, up to a maximum of 25,000 euros. 
Although this change is not mentioned in the 
preamble, it clearly also aims to be a simplification, 
as the low value of the items concerned makes 
the administrative cost of calculating their annual 
depreciation somewhat unreasonable. 
Does the corporate tax influence decisions about 
the types of investments to make? Tax advisers’ 
opinions are somewhat contrary on this point, 
suggesting that the changes made by the new 
legislation are unlikely to have much impact 
on decisions of this kind, and it therefore looks 
positive that priority has been given to simplicity 
over efficiency. 
The neutrality of assets in which to hold 
savings 
The Spanish personal income tax enacted by 
Law 35/2006 represented a significant change in 
the income tax model by explicitly introducing a 
dual rate, whereby a substantial share of income 
from savings forms a separate tax base that is 
taxed at lower tax rates. The purpose alluded to 
in the preamble to the law was to give “neutral 
treatment to income from savings, eliminating 
the unjustified differences that currently exist 
between the instruments in which they are held,” 
as well as improving “Spain’s position in the 
international context of free movement of capital 
and strong competition.” However, Law 35/2006 
did not introduce absolute neutrality, insofar as 
other investment income is not included in the 
savings tax base (e.g. income from real estate and 
earnings from economic activities arising from the 
capital allocated to them), nor does it eliminate 
the special treatment that for various reasons the 
law establishes in favour of certain assets (e.g. 
tax credit for the purchase of a main residence or 
the reduction in the tax base for contributions to 
pension schemes). 
Subsequently, the deduction for taxpayers’ 
investments in their home ceased to apply as of 
2013, although on a transitional basis, it remains 
in effect for all taxpayers purchasing their home 
before that time. The new individual income tax 
law maintains these transitional arrangements. 
What is new is the elimination of the tax credit for 
renting of the main residence, which had been 
introduced in 2008, under similar terms to the 
deduction for purchase, although conditional upon 
taxpayers’ income levels. The reform therefore 
unifies the tax treatment of main residences that 
are rented or owned.16 
As Table 1 shows, tax advisers strongly agree that 
personal income tax has encouraged taxpayers 
to purchase their homes rather than rent them. 
The average value of the replies is 3.051. The 
elimination of the deduction for rent may certainly 
improve the neutrality of the tax as regards 
taxpayers’ decisions to buy or rent their home, but 
it is worth noting that other significant features of 
the law on personal income tax and other taxes 
continue to offer highly favourable tax treatment of 
home purchases. The non-imputation of income 
for use of the main residence and exemption of 
possible capital gains on the sale of the main 
residence by taxpayers aged over 65 are two clear 
examples of aspects of personal income tax that 
favour home purchasing. Likewise, the exemption 
16 On a transitional basis it also allows application to leases entered into before 2015.
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of the main residence from wealth tax and the 
reduction provided by gifts and inheritance tax are 
two major examples of tax advantages favouring 
home purchase, contrary to the supposed 
neutrality vis-à-vis renting. 
In relation to savings, however, the new tax reform 
introduces other significant changes such as the 
favourable treatment given to long-term savings 
plans (PALP in their Spanish initials). In order 
to encourage long-term saving, the new rules 
allow taxpayers to pay up to 5,000 euros a year 
into individual long-term life-insurance policies 
or long-term individual savings accounts. The 
yields produced by these savings mechanisms 
are exempt provided the taxpayer receives them 
as capital and five years have passed since the 
payment was made into the policy or account. 
The aim here is basically to encourage savings by 
small investors.
In this regard, another noteworthy change is that 
all capital losses and gains are incorporated in 
the tax base, regardless of the period over which 
they accrued. This had been the case since the 
introduction of the current tax in 2007, but during 
2013 and 2014 they were included in the general 
tax base when the accrual period was less than 
a year.
What is tax advisers’ opinion about the neutrality 
of the personal income tax regarding the types of 
assets in which people invest? The average value 
of the answers, 2.312, shows a certain degree of 
agreement that the tax is not neutral with regard 
to savings, although the opinion is not so clear 
cut as in the case of homes. The new PALPs 
imply favourable tax treatment for a certain type 
of saving by means of a tax concession, namely 
the exemption of their earnings, with the aim of 
fostering long-term saving, although this means 
distorting tax neutrality. 
Conclusions 
This article set out to assess the content of the 
tax reform passed in late 2014. To perform 
this assessment, we have described the most 
important legal changes, specifically those 
affecting the income tax and corporate tax. The 
assessment has drawn on the results of a survey 
of professional tax advisers. Their responses 
should be viewed as a first-hand check on the 
shortcomings of Spain’s fiscal system, focusing 
on aspects, such as efficiency, tax planning, 
equity and complexity. We believe this type of 
analysis helps ascertaining the real view that the 
tax consultancy world has of our fiscal system. 
The recent reform of income tax and corporate 
tax is headed in the right direction in that 
it removes distortions and mitigates tax 
planning, as well as reduces complexity. 
The assessment of the cut in marginal rates, 
on the other hand, is a matter of individual 
preferences.
Based on our review of the changes and tax 
advisers’ opinions, we believe that the reform 
is headed in the right direction in terms of 
eliminating distortions and mitigating tax planning 
(e.g. the treatment of debt and equity in the 
corporate tax, limiting the application of objective 
estimation by modules in personal income tax, 
or eliminating the distinction between long- and 
short-term capital gains), and reducing complexity 
(e.g. depreciation in the corporate tax), and 
therefore, certain trade-offs have been achieved. 
Any possible assessment of the cuts in marginal 
rates –leaving efficiency issues to one side– is a 
subjective matter. Finally, we note that it would be 
desirable –as the survey findings also suggest– to 
avoid legislative hyperactivity and that the results 
of this reform underpin the start of the Spanish 
economy’s recovery and greater stability in our 
fiscal system. 
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